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Abstract 
We estimate the effect of exogenous changes in taxes on the US unemployment rate and on several 
other labor market variables. Our estimates are based on a revised version of the Romer and Romer 
(2010) narrative record of exogenous tax innovations, with the additional benefit of distinguishing 
between capital income and labor income taxes. We first show that accounting for the difference 
between automatic and discretionary tax changes in the revised specification is crucial in order to 
obtain an unbiased measure of the tax multipliers. We then obtain the following main results. An 
increase in tax receipts of one percent of GDP has a sizeable positive impact on the unemployment 
rate, and a negative impact on hours worked, labor market tightness and job finding probability.  
The effect on GDP is also sizeable, but somewhat in the mid range of other values found in the 
literature, due to the fact that we account for the difference between discretionary and automatic 
changes in tax revenues. The effect on the unemployment rate of variations in business taxes is 
larger than that of personal income taxes. We suggest that the latter result poses interesting 
challenges for future research. 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo estimamos el efecto de los cambios exógenos en los impuestos sobre la tasa de 
desempleo de EE.UU. y en varias otras variables del mercado laboral. Nuestras estimaciones se 
basan en una versión revisada del registro narrativo Romer y Romer (2010) de innovaciones 
tributarias exógenas, con el aporte adicional de distinguir entre las rentas del capital y los impuestos 
sobre las rentas del trabajo. En primer lugar, mostramos que la contabilización de la diferencia entre 
los cambios fiscales automáticos y discrecionales en la especificación revisada es crucial para 
obtener una medida objetiva de los multiplicadores fiscales. Luego, obtenemos los siguientes 
resultados principales. Un aumento de la recaudación tributaria de uno por ciento del PIB tiene un 
impacto considerable positivo en la tasa de desempleo, y un impacto negativo sobre las horas 
trabajadas, opresión en el mercado de trabajo y en la probabilidad de encontrar trabajo. El efecto 
sobre el PIB también es importante, pero dentro del rango medio de otros valores que se encuentran 
en la literatura, debido al hecho que representa la diferencia entre los cambios discrecionales y 
automáticas de los ingresos fiscales. El efecto sobre la tasa de desempleo de las variaciones en los 
impuestos corporativos es mayor que el de los impuestos sobre la renta personal. Sugerimos que el 
último resultado plantea retos interesantes para futuras investigaciones. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the defining features of the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-09 has been its 
persistent impact on the US labor market, with the unemployment rate roughly doubling 
from early 2008 through mid 2010 (see Figure 1). This has ignited an intense debate on the 
appropriate stimulus response of fiscal policy. This debate has revolved around two main 
issues: (i) the relative merits of higher government spending vs. tax cuts; (ii) the suitability 
of labor income vs. capital income tax cuts. In Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010) we 
address part of the debate related to point (i). In that paper, however, we are mostly 
concerned with estimating the size of the unemployment multiplier of government 
spending. In this paper, we focus on the effects on the labor market of variations in taxes. 
The idea that tax cuts are likely to be a more effective stimulus device than higher 
government spending is widespread in both the business and the academic community. This 
idea, however, often remains vague, for it typically does not distinguish between 
expansionary effects of tax cuts on GDP and its alleged, more specific, implications for the 
unemployment rate and the labor market as a whole. For instance, in a Wall Street Journal
editorial on 29 January, 2009, Alberto Alesina and Luigi Zingales argue that "tax cuts have 
a much better effect on job-creation than highway rehabilitation", but propositions of this 
sort remain so far virtually untested in the literature. 
Advocates of measures geared towards a cut in capital income taxes have mainly 
proposed two types of interventions. First, a reduction in capital gains taxes. The idea 
underlying this proposal is that this recession is unique because it originates from credit 
markets, where investors are still reluctant to lend to risky firms. Hence a reduction in 
capital gains taxes would boost the willingness of investors to take risks
1. Skeptics of this 
proposal, however, mostly doubt the effectiveness of variations in capital gains taxes 
specifically on job creation. A second type of intervention that has been advocated is a 
                                                            
1 This argument has been made, for instance, by Alesina and Zingales in the same WSJ editorial cited above. 2
 
reduction in depreciation allowances: firms that purchase new machines and other capital 
goods would be able to write them off immediately, instead of over many years
2.
  Some argue, however, that in a period of exceptionally low interest rates the latter 
measure is likely to have a limited impact, and insist on options mostly geared towards cuts 
in payroll taxes
3. The argument is that a cut in payroll taxes would boost output and 
employment both by increasing demand for goods and services and by providing incentives 
for additional hiring; also, others have noted that firms are hoarding a large share of profits 
but still perceive the cost of labor to be too high.
4
Most of the recent debate on the alleged merits of tax cuts has revolved around whether or 
not extending the tax cuts enacted under President George W. Bush. These tax cuts refer to 
two laws passed in 2001 and 2003 under the Bush administration that reduced tax rates 
across the board on income, dividends and capital gains, as well as on other specific 
categories. The Obama administration has recently passed a temporary two-year extension 
of most of the Bush cuts as a part of a larger economic plan. Supporters of this measure 
have argued that a failure to extend the cuts would have implied an actual increase in taxes 
for the whole population by the end of 2010
5.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, however, extending all of the Bush tax 
cuts may have a small "bang for the buck", the equivalent of a 10- to 40-cent increase in 
GDP for every tax dollar foregone. The argument (a classic one) goes that the Bush tax cuts 
                                                            
2 See for instance the Wall Street Journal editorial by Glenn Hubbard, September 10, 2010. 
3 Congressional Budget Office (2010). 
4 See for instance Roubini (2010). 
5 For instance, Rep. McConnell has reportedly said that "only in Washington could someone propose a tax 
hike as an antidote to a recession". Some Senate Democrats such as Kent Conrad of North Dakota, Evan Bayh 
of Indiana and Ben Nelson of Nebraska have also argued "against raising taxes on anyone during a fragile 
economic recovery" (Gale and Harris, 2010). As another example, Bill Rys, tax counsel for the National 
Federation of Independent Business, a small-business group, has argued that "[t]he best thing to do is to get 
rid of uncertainty, and that includes the cliff we're falling off with all these [tax] provisions that are expiring," 
(Weisman and McKinnon, 2010). 3
 
mostly go to higher-income households, who have a relatively low marginal propensity to 
consume.
6
Interestingly, of eleven potential stimulus policies the CBO recently examined, an 
extension of all of the Bush tax cuts seems to imply the lowest stimulus per tax dollar 
foregone.
7
Therefore, some argue that the government could have more effectively stimulated the 
economy by letting the high-income tax cuts expire and use those savings for a combination 
of a job-creation tax credit and continued state fiscal assistance that would have allegedly 
generated "three times as much additional economic activity as using them to extend the 
high-income tax cuts" (Gale, 2010; Marr 2010). Taking the CBO estimates literally, each of 
these measures is "estimated" to have roughly about three times the impact on GDP as 
continuing the Bush tax cuts.
8
Different views about the extension of the tax cuts also depend on the perceived tradeoff 
between stimulus today and sustainability tomorrow. As reported by Gale and Harris 
(2010), former Obama administration budget director Peter Orszag has endorsed extending 
the Bush tax cuts for both middle-income taxpayers and the wealthy, but only for two 
years: temporary extension of the tax cuts "would keep the economy humming during the 
recovery", but a more permanent extension of the tax cuts---even if limited to middle-
income households---"is simply unaffordable because of the impact on the deficit". Alan 
Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, called an extension of the Bush tax 
cuts without corresponding spending reductions "disastrous".
9
These quotations do only partial justice to the complex ramifications of the current debate 
on the appropriate size and composition of the response of fiscal policy to the Great 
                                                            
6 In work in progress, Monacelli and Perotti (2011) explore (both empirically and theoretically) precisely the 
issue of whether "pro-poor" tax cuts (i.e., tax cuts favoring households in the lower brackets of the income 
distribution) are more expansionary than tax cuts that redistribute in favor of the "rich". 
7 See CBO (2010), Table 1. 
8 See CBO (2010), Table 1. 
9 See Gale and Harris (2010). 4
 
Recession. That debate, however, almost invariably relies on rather unstructured empirical 
evidence on the effects of tax changes on the macroeconomy, let alone on the labor market. 
As an illustration, CBO (2010) reports that "low and high estimates of multipliers for a 
given policy were chosen, on a judgmental basis, to encompass most economists' views 
about the effects of that type of policy". 
As exemplified by the above discussion, tax changes can occur for a variety of reasons, 
including (as it is mostly the case in the current recession) as endogenous reaction to the 
state of the economy.  But in order to gauge the economic and quantitative significance of 
any tax measure, one needs to identify those changes that happen for reasons unrelated to 
current (and/or anticipated) developments in the economy.  
In this paper we study the effect of exogenous variations in taxes on the US 
unemployment rate and on several other labor market variables. Our estimates are based on 
a revised version of the Romer and Romer (2010) narrative record of exogenous tax 
innovations.
10 There are two main differences in our data set relative to that of Romer and 
Romer: first, while they use data on tax liabilities, we track the quarterly exogenous 
changes in receipts generated by each tax bill; second, we distinguish between different 
types of taxes: personal, corporate, indirect, social security, and several subcomponents of 
each of these.
11 Using this disaggregation, in this paper we begin to address some of the 
policy issues quoted above, although not yet at the level of detail that one might like: for 
instance, there is not enough variation in the post-war time series to address issues like the 
relative merits of capital gains taxation vs. employment tax credits. 
    Our results are based also on a different empirical methodology from that used by 
Romer and Romer: following Perotti (2010), we show that accounting for the difference 
between automatic and discretionary tax changes is crucial to obtain an unbiased measure 
of the effects of tax changes. By doing so, we find estimates of the effects of tax shocks that 
are typically in between the extremely large effects estimated by Romer and Romer, and 
                                                            
10 We do not address here the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated tax innovations, as done, for 
instance, in Mertens and Ravn (2009). 
11 See Perotti (2010) for more details. 5
 
the much smaller (and often statistically insignificant) effects estimated by Favero and 
Giavazzi (2010). 
    We obtain the following main results. First, an increase in tax liabilities of one percent 
of GDP has a sizeable positive impact on the unemployment rate and a sizeable negative 
impact on GDP, hours worked, employment, labor market tightness and the job finding 
probability. For instance, under our preferred empirical specification, the unemployment 
rate increases -after six quarters- by .50 percentage points and GDP falls by 1.2 percent. 
Second, we find that the data set matters. When we employ exactly the original Romer and 
Romer (2010) specification but with our data set, the size of virtually all estimated 
multipliers decline substantially in absolute value. Third, we find that the multiplier on 
private investment is particularly large and persistent, with investment contracting by about 
5 percent after 6 and 12 quarters. Fourth, the effect on GDP and on labor market variables 
of shocks to taxes on business is typically larger than the effect of shocks to labor income 
taxes. In the conclusions we discuss some of the possible theoretical implications of this 
result. 
    The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present our estimation 
methodology. Section 3 briefly discusses the data. Section 4 presents the main results. In 
section 5, we show the effects of the main types of taxes. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Estimates of discretionary taxation 
In this section we introduce our methodology to estimate the effects of discretionary 
taxation
12.
2.1  Romer and Romer (2010) and Favero and Giavazzi (2010) 
Romer and Romer (2010) (R-R henceforth), estimate an equation of the type: 
                                                            
12 See again Perotti (2010) for more details on the methodology. Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2010) 
use a DGSE model to compare a SVAR-based identification strategy of tax shocks to one based on narrative 
records. They conclude that the different tax multipliers obtained from the SVAR and narrative approaches do 
not depend on differences in the transmission mechanism, but rather on either a failure to identify the same 
tax shock or to small sample uncertainty. 6
 
  	 
  (1)
where  is the variable of interest, 	 is a measure of tax shocks constructed by R-R 
based on the original documentation accompanying tax bills, and  is a lag polynomial 
of order 
 (in R-R, 
  , i.e.,  includes powers 0 to 12 of the lag operator ). For 
future reference, we call this the "R-R one equation specification". R-R typically find that, 
in response to a tax shock of 1 percentage point of GDP, output declines by up to three 
percent within three years. These effects have appeared to many as implausibly large. 
In fact, Favero and Giavazzi (2010) (F-G henceforth) argue that these results are due to an 
erroneous specification of the regression to be estimated. They argue that equation (1) 
cannot be derived from the correct truncated MA representation of any underlying VAR. 
Let the vector   include n endogenous variables of interest, say output , government 
spending , the interest rate , government revenues  , and a labor market variable such 
as the unemployment rate. One should then treat the R-R tax shocks as exogenous variables 
in a reduced form VAR in  . Formally this corresponds to the following model: 

     
	  
  (2)
where  is a lag polynomial of order 4,  is a    vector and  ,  is a vector of 
reduced form residuals. F-G estimate (2) by OLS, and argue that the correct impulse 
responses are obtained by simply tracing the dynamic effects of a shock to 	 of one 
percentage point of GDP. For future reference, we call the one in equation (2) the "OLS F-
G specification". 
Notice that if one is interested only in the effects of the R-R tax shocks, there is no need to 
go beyond this reduced form specification, provided the two identifying assumptions of R-
R are satisfied: (i) 	 is orthogonal to  , and (ii) 	 is unpredictable using lagged variables 
in the information set of the econometrician. F-G find that a one percentage point of GDP 
realization of 	 causes a decline in output by less than one percent, and often insignificant. 7
 
The correct truncated MA representation of (2) is: 
   	 
  
   (3)
where  is a lag polynomial of order
,  is of the same order as , and     is a 
moving average of  . As Favero and Giavazzi (2010) argue, a comparison of (1) with the 
first row of (3) shows that R-R's equation (1) does not correspond to the first equation of 
the truncated MA representation of the original VAR, because R-R omit the lagged values 
of the endogenous variables
13.
2.2 Discretionary and automatic tax changes 
Perotti (2010) argues that the specification adopted by F-G is also incorrect if one wants 
to capture the dynamic effects of the R-R tax shocks. The reason is that changes in tax 
revenues are the combination of discretionary changes to taxation, which reflect intentional 
actions of the policymakers like changes in tax rates, depreciation allowances, deductions, 
etc., and automatic changes to revenues, which reflect the effects of output, inflation etc. on 
tax revenues, for given tax rates. 
Let therefore tax revenues be given by the following expression: 




-  ./ /0/ /1
*2(3*#%
(4)
where 	 (the R-R tax shocks) captures the changes in discretionary taxation,  is a 
vector of endogenous variables that includes the same variables as  , except , and , is a 
   4  vector of coefficients. For simplicity, we will refer to the term , 
-  as 
the "automatic" component of tax changes. 
                                                            
13 R-R also estimate a version of (1) that includes lags 1 to 4 of , but this does not address the criticism 
raised by F-G. 8
 
Perotti (2010) argues that the discretionary and the automatic components of changes in 
tax revenues are likely to have different effects on output. One can think of at least two 
reasons for this. First, discretionary changes are more distortionary, because they consist of 
changes in both tax rates and tax rules. Second, discretionary tax changes are likely to be 
more persistent. In order to see this, suppose taxation is defined with reference to trend or 
potential output, so that deviations of output from the reference level sum to zero over the 
cycle. In this case, if agents are not liquidity constrained, the automatic component of 
taxation should have no effect on the agents' behavior, because neither tax rates nor the 
present value of tax payments change
14.
In light of this distinction, the correct specification of the model is not (2), but (4) 
combined with the VAR: 
   
	 
 4	  
  (5)
where is a lag polynomial of order 5. Combining (4) and (5) one obtains: 
54 6, 7 







where D0 is the vector of coefficients of  when  9 and   is a lag polynomial 
of order 4 defined as 46:
Rearranging, (6) yields: 




where ; ?5 4 @,A¹7 
 , 8, < ?5 4 @,A¹, =  5 4
@,A¹, and > ? 54 6,.
                                                            
14 One could argue that a purely cyclical source of changes in revenues could matter if individuals are moved 
into different tax brackets, so that the average marginal income tax rate changes. This effect is however likely 
to be second order.9
 
Mertens and Ravn (2010) (M-R henceforth) perform an OLS regression of  on its lags 
and on 	and its lags, therefore treating the term =- 
>  in (7) as the error term. We 
will refer to the one in (7) as the “OLS M-R specification”. 
However, the OLS M-R approach gives biased estimates because -# is likely to be 
correlated with #. The solution is to take - and its lags out of the error term and include 
them explicitly as regressors in (7). This can be done by an instrumental variable estimation 
of (4), which allows one to recover an estimate of -
15. The natural instruments for the 
variables in  in (4) are lags of  and lags of 	. We call this the “IV M-R specification”. 
As we will see, IV and OLS M-R estimates are similar, and both display much stronger 
effects on all endogenous variables than the OLS F-G specification. We now show that 
both these observations are relatively easy to explain in our context. 
To see why the OLS F-G specification is likely to lead to attenuated estimates of the 
effects of a tax shock, use (7) to replace the vector  in (4). This gives: 






Stacking (7) and (8), and collapsing the polynomials in - and the terms in > in the error 
terms of each equation of the resulting system, it is easy to see that one can "almost" 
reproduce the F-G reduced form specification (2), except that the lags of  in the latter are 
replaced in (8) by lags of 	.
Consider therefore an OLS estimation of the F-G specification (2), when the true model is 
given by (7) and (8). There are two sources of bias in the OLS F-G approach. The first is 
the same as in the OLS M-R approach: the lags of - are likely to be correlated with the 
                                                            
15 To do so, one needs a third identifying assumption, in addition to the RR assumptions: > should be 
uncorrelated with current and past values of -.10 
 
lags of . The second source of bias stems from the inclusion of lags of  instead of lags 
of 	. The difference between # and 	# has two components. The first is  ,#, which 
gets incorporated in the polynomial ,; on the right hand side of (8) and does not 
cause any harm; the second component, -# , introduces a classic error in variable 
problem. As it is well known, error in variables typically biases estimated coefficients 
towards zero. The solution to both problems consists once again in taking - and its lags 
out of the error term, generating the IV F-G estimates. In fact, it can be shown that, if one 
used exactly the same instruments to estimate (4), the IV F-G and IV M-R estimates are 
numerically identical. 
To see why the OLS M-R and IV M-R estimates are very close to each other, note that 
when  9  in (5), so that automatic tax changes have no effects, OLS M-R responses 
are consistent because lagged values of - do not appear in the error term. Thus, the fact 
that OLS M-R and IV M-R responses are close is an indication that the effects of automatic 
tax changes are negligible.
Note that OLS F-G responses continue to be inconsistent, because it remains true that this 
specification has lags of  instead of 	. If instead   , so that the two 
components of tax changes have the same effects, OLS F-G responses are consistent, 
because  is the right variable to have in the system. The intuition is clear: in this case, 
there is no need to decompose lags of  into the discretionary and the automatic 
components. 
2.3 Back to Romer and Romer 
We have seen that the original R-R approach, as exemplified by equation (1), has 
problems in small samples because it omits some terms of the truncated MA representation. 
F-G's version of the truncated MA representation, equation (3), includes these terms but has 
the problem that it does not allow for different effects of the discretionary and automatic 
components of tax changes. The correct truncated MA representation can be derived from 
(7) and takes the form: 11 
 
 D 	 
E 
   (9)

where D is a lag polynomial of order
, E is of the same order as , and   is a 
moving average of - and >. Henceforth we call this the “OLS augmented R-R 
specification”. Note the difference with (3), which includes  among the endogenous 
variables, while (9) does not. 
Once again, an OLS estimate of (9) generates biased impulse responses because of the 
correlation between lags of - in the error term and lags of . The solution, as usual, is to 
take lags of - out of the error term; we denote the resulting specification the “IV 
augmented R-R specification”. 
3 The data 
Perotti (2010) presents a new set of data that extends the R-R data in several dimensions. 
That paper provides full details on the construction of the data; here we summarize the 
main points. First, the aggregate tax shocks are divided into four main categories: (i) 
personal, (ii) corporate, (iii) social security, and (iv) indirect taxes, as well as several 
subcategories. We exploit this disaggregation in section 5. 
Second, unlike R-R, who collect data on liabilities, Perotti (2010) collects data on both 
receipts and liabilities, whenever the distinction is made in the sources. In this paper, we 
use receipts, although the difference in effects between receipts and liabilities is small.  
Third, R-R typically report the effect of a tax legislation as the first full year effect of 
liability changes  after enactment, and attribute that number to the quarter of enactment. But 
there are cases where a tax legislation manifests its effects gradually over several quarters. 
For instance, accelerated depreciation typically causes a large change in the time profile of 
receipts, but a small change in their present discounted value: receipts decline initially but 
increase later. Using the first full-year effect would therefore provide a distorted picture of 
the effects of the tax measure. Whenever possible, Perotti (2010) follows the effects of tax 
legislation over time. 12 
 
Fourth, while R-R attribute all the effects of retroactive changes to the first quarter of 
enactment, Perotti (2010) keeps track of the effects of retroactive measures over time. This 
can make a considerable difference, particularly in the case of corporate income taxation. 
4 Estimates 
In this section we present the results of our empirical analysis, based on a battery of 
alternative specifications and decompositions of the data set. 
4.1 Specifications 
To summarize the discussion of the previous section, we estimate the following 
specifications: 
Romer-Romer (R-R) one equation specification 
F  	 
G  (10)
where  is of order 13 and F is the variable of interest. 
Augmented Romer-Romer (R-R) specification
  H	 
I 
G  (11)
where H is of order 13 and  of order 4. The vector  includes the log change of 
real per capita output J, the log change of real primary government spending per capita 
J, the first difference of the interest rate J, and the first difference of a labor market 
variable, each considered in turn (see more below). As suggested above, this is a 
multidimensional extension of the original R-R one-equation regression, with the addition 
of lags 13 to 16 of the endogenous variables, as it should be if the MA representation is 
truncated correctly. 13 
 
Favero-Giavazzi (F-G) specification 
  K 	  
  
G  (12)
with  of order 4. 

Mertens-Ravn (M-R) specification 
  H	 
 
G  (13)
where H and  are of order 5 and 4, respectively. 
All specifications described above also include a constant. To maximize comparability 
with Romer and Romer (2010), in the baseline case we estimate all these specifications in 
first differences. All these specifications, except the R-R one equation specification, are 
estimated by both OLS and IV, as discussed above. In the latter case, the set of regressors 
includes also the moving average (lags 0 to 4) of the series - obtained by IV estimation of 
(4), using as instruments lags 1 to 4 of the variables included in the vector , and lags 0 to 
4 of 	
16.
In all cases the initial shock is a realization of the R-R tax shock of 1 percentage point of 
GDP. We report both 68 percent confidence bands, that have been used extensively in the 
recent empirical fiscal policy literature, and the more traditional 95 percent confidence 
bands
17. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping with 1000 replications. We display 
both the point estimates of the impulse responses and the median response of the 
replications. In most cases, the two impulse responses are indistinguishable in the figures. 
                                                            
16 In the case of the F-G specification, the set of instruments includes also lags 1 to 4 of  and only lag 0 of 
	.
17 In their original work, R-R mostly display 68 percent confidence bands. 14 
 
Sample  The sample of Perotti (2010)'s data on 	 is 1945:1 – 2008:2 (the sample of 
R-R data is 1947:1 - 2006:2). The other constraints on the sample are the series on the log 
change in GDP, government spending, and revenues per capita, that start in 1948:2
18. With 
four lags of the endogenous variables as instruments, the estimated series - starts in 
1949:2; and since at least four lags of the endogenous variables appear in each 
specification, the earliest starting date of an IV estimate is 1950:2. 
Labor market variables  We consider the following labor market variables: the 
unemployment rate, the log of unemployment, and the log of the labor force (the latter two 
variables divided by population)
19; the job finding probability (calculated using data on 
unemployment and short term unemployment as in Shimer, 2005), labor market tightness 
(the ratio of vacancies to unemployment), the log of vacancies (as a share of the 
population), and the separation rate (also calculated following Shimer, 2005); the log of 
employment and hours in the private sector and in manufacturing, all as shares of the 
population;
20 the log of the real product wage in manufacturing and in the business sector;
21
and the markup in manufacturing and in the non financial business sector.
4.2 Results
In Figures 2 to 4 we show the impulse responses to shocks to taxes for the alternative 
methodologies described above (for the R-R one equation specification, we only report the 
multipliers in Table 1 below). 
Favero-Giavazzi OLS specification Figure 2 displays responses from an OLS F-G   
specification. Private consumption and private investment all decline, but by much less than 
estimated by R-R; GDP even increases slightly, although with very large standard errors. 
                                                            
18 The NIPA data on the levels of these variables start in 1947:1, but in the FRED dataset the data on 
population starts in 1948:1. The interest rate is defined as the average cost servicing the debt, and it is 
constructed by Favero and Giavazzi (2010) by dividing net interest payments at time t by the federal 
government debt held by the public at time  L4  .
19 Here and in what follows, "population" stands for "population age 16 and above". 
20 Total nonfarm employment and civilian employment behave almost exactly like private employment, and 
the same for hours. 
21 These are obtained by dividing the nominal wages by the producer price index. 15 
 
All labor market variables also move very little, and never significantly at the 95 percent 
level of confidence. The unemployment rate increases by a mere 0.15 percentage points at 
the peak, and the response is entirely insignificant even at the 68 percent level. As we have 
already argued above, if indeed the discretionary and automatic components of fiscal policy 
have different effects, an attenuated response to a discretionary tax shock is what we should 
expect. 
Mertens-Ravn IV specification Figure 3 displays responses from the IV M-R 
specification. The responses are now much stronger. GDP falls by 1.2 percent after 6 
quarters, less than half the decline estimated by R-R, but still much more than the F-G 
estimate; private consumption falls by 0.7 percent,   and private investment by about 5 
percent, again in between the R-R and F-G estimates. The standard error bands are now 
much tighter; the GDP and private investment responses are significant at the 95 percent 
level, the consumption response only at the 68 percent level. Private investment also 
declines, but the response is significant only at the trough of 3 percent after 3 quarters. 
Qualitatively, all labor market variables move in a direction which is economically 
meaningful.
22 In all cases (with the exception of the real wage and the markup) the 
responses are significant or nearly significant at the 95 percent level, usually after a few 
quarters. The unemployment rate increases gradually, reaching a peak of about 0.6 
percentage points after 6 quarters, and then stabilizes at that level. The next two panels of 
the first row show that most of the action comes from the increase in unemployment, but 
there is also a decline of the labor force participation by about 0.2 percent , although 
significant only at the 68 percent level. 
The job finding probability falls gradually, reaching a peak reduction of about three 
percentage points after 2 years. Similarly, labor market tightness falls gradually by almost  
20 percent after 2 years. This decline is due in almost equal measure to a decrease in 
                                                            
22  We do not employ a formal theoretical model in this version of the paper, but these results are all 
qualitatively consistent with a benchmark RBC model with search and matching frictions in the labor market, 
like the one in Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010), which is used to study the effects of government 
spending. See more below on this point. 16 
 
vacancies and to an increase in unemployment (see the second panel of the second row and 
the third panel of the third row). The separation rate increases by about 0.15 percentage 
point after one year. This implies that both the hiring and the separation margin contribute 
considerably to the decrease in employment. 
The third row displays the responses of private and manufacturing employment and hours. 
Hours decline, by about 1 percent in both sectors; both are significant at the 95 percent 
level. Virtually all the response of hours is due to the extensive margin: employment tracks 
hours almost exactly. Finally, the real wage and the markup in manufacturing and in the 
business sector (last row) move little, and the standard errors tend to be large. 
The OLS estimates of all these responses obtained under the Mertens and Ravn 
specification (not shown) are very similar to the IV estimates displayed here; as discussed 
above, this is consistent with the effect of the automatic component of tax changes, 
captured by , being small. In contrast, the IV responses of the Favero-Giavazzi 
specification (also not shown)
23 are different from the corresponding OLS responses 
displayed in Figure 2: this is consistent with a large difference between the effects of the 
discretionary and of the automatic components of tax changes. 
Romer and Romer augmented MA specification As a comparison, it is interesting to 
display the responses of the augmented OLS R-R MA specification (see Figure 4). As we 
have seen, this is a multidimensional extension of the original R-R one-equation regression. 
The responses are often slightly stronger than the IV M-R responses, and the standard 
errors bands tighter. In particular, unemployment increases more, and hours, employment 
and GDP decline more. There is also more evidence of an increase in the product wage, 
particularly in manufacturing, where it rises by 2 percent after 2 years, and significant at 95 
percent level. These results are consistent with Perotti (2010), who shows that IV M-R 
responses of output are often in between the large responses estimated by R-R (though with 
                                                            
23 As discussed above, IV F-G responses are very similar to IV M-R responses, and numerically identical if 
the same instruments are used to estimate equation (4). 
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a single equation approach rather than an augmented R-R specification as here) and the 
small responses estimated by F-G. 
Multipliers  Table 1 summarizes the main results in terms of "tax multipliers". It displays 
the (point estimates of the) impulse responses of the main variables of interest, respectively 
at 6 and 12 quarters, for the three alternative methodologies: OLS F-G, IV M-R, and OLS 
R-R augmented MA. In addition, in the first two rows we also display responses from the 
one equation R-R specification, estimated with the original R-R data and with our data. 
Recall that the underlying tax shock is normalized to 1 percent point of GDP. 
Four observations stand out. First, the R-R one equation specification does deliver much 
stronger responses. In the first row, where we use the original R-R data on the tax shocks, 
the unemployment effect at 12 quarters is 1.10, the GDP effect  -2.74 (as in Romer and 
Romer, 2010), and the investment effect  an impressive -9.69 percent. These numbers are 
about 2 to 3 times larger than the IV M-R effects. 
Second, the tax data do make a difference: in the second row, where we use our own 
estimates of the tax shocks, the effects on virtually all variables decline in absolute value, 
although they usually remain larger than in the IV M-R specification. From now on, the 
results we report use our estimates of the tax shocks. 
Third, the augmented R-R specification (the multivariate extension of the one equation R-
R specification) still tends to deliver higher estimates of the unemployment and the GDP 
effects than the IV M-R specification. In contrast, and as we discussed, the F-G 
specification features much smaller and often insignificant multipliers. Under our preferred 
specification (IV M-R), the unemployment rate rises by 0.54 percentage points after 6 
quarters, whereas GDP falls by 0.93 percent; the responses at 12 quarters are almost 
identical. Noticeably, both the unemployment and the GDP multipliers estimated under the 
IV M-R specification are a bit smaller than the corresponding multipliers of government 
spending that we estimated in Monacelli, Perotti and Trigari (2010).18 
 
Fourth, the investment multiplier is sizeable, both in the IV M-R and in the augmented R-
R specifications (after 6 quarters, -3.88 percent and -2.93 percent respectively, although in 
the latter case it is estimated rather imprecisely). Once again, and at both horizons, the 
effect on investment under the F-G specification is smaller and not statistically significant. 
Table 1. Tax Multipliers under Alternative Specifications. 
  6 qrts  12 qrts  6 qrts  12 qrts  6 qrts  12 qrts 
  unemployment rate  job finding prob.  private employment 
OLS R-R one eq. (R-R data)  .32*  1.10*  -1.98*  -4.76*  -.44*  -2.07* 
OLS R-R one eq. (our data)  .30*  .67**  -.78  -2.51*  -.59*  -1.35** 
OLS augmented R-R  .70**  .74**  -2.56** -2.09** -1.13** -1.22** 
OLS F-G  -.05  -.05  .57  .46  -.01  .03 
IV  M-R  .49*  .54** -1.79* -2.17* -.75**  -.94* 
  business wage  private investment  GDP 
OLS R-R one eq. (R-R data)  -.58*  -.51*  -3.56*  -9.69*  -1.17**  -2.74** 
OLS R-R one eq. (our data)  .11  .17  -1.63  -3.30  -.82*  -1.73** 
OLS augmented R-R  .37  .51  -5.58**  3.01  -1.52**  -1.54** 
OLS F-G  .09  .12  -.71  -.84  .34  .35* 
IV M-R  .05  .04  -4.67* -5.11* -1.15* -1.10* 
Note: * denotes 32% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level. See Section 4.1 for the 
details of the alternative specifications.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
5 Labor and corporate income taxes 
One benefit of the dataset we use is that it allows us to distinguish between different types 
of taxes. Table 2 lists the four main categories of taxes and their subcategories. The sum of 
all these items is the aggregate taxes that have been used so far. 19 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of Taxes. 
 Personal  Corporate  Indirect.  Soc.  Sec 




Employment credit    Earnings base 
3.  Tax credits  Investment tax credit    Others 
4. Capital  gains  Depreciation     
5. Depreciation  Others     
6. 
Earned Income Tax 
Credit
   
7. Rebates       
8.  Estate and gift       
9. Others       
Source: Own elaboration. 
We now re-group taxes into three main categories: (i) Labor income taxes; (ii) Business 
taxes I; (iii) Business taxes II. Labor income taxes include personal income taxes, except 
for items 4 and 5 (capital gains taxes and depreciation allowances), and social security 
taxes. Business taxes I include corporate income taxes and items 4 and 5 of personal 
income taxes; Business taxes II also includes indirect taxes. We summarize our categories 
in Table 3 below. 
Table 3. Labor and Business Taxes. 
Labor Income Taxes  Business Taxes I  Business Taxes II 
Personal income  Corporate income  Corporate income 
Social security  Capital gains, personal  Capital gains, personal 
  Depreciation, personal  Depreciation, personal 
   Indirect  taxes 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Figure 5 displays the results. We only display the responses of the main variables: for 
instance, we have seen that the impulse responses of tightness and of vacancies track the 
response of the job finding probability very closely, hence we only display the latter.20 
 
The effects of labor income taxes are virtually identical to those of all taxes combined. In 
contrast, the effects of the two types of business taxes are stronger, particularly under the 
second definition; the first definition tracks the second one closely in the first year, but then 
returns to the stochastic trend more quickly. 
Under the second definition, a shock to business taxes raises the unemployment rate by 
twice as much as a shock to labor income taxes of the same size; similarly, it causes a 
decline in the job finding probability, employment in the private sector, GDP and private 
investment by twice as much or more. It also causes a 3 percent decline in the business 
sector wage, which instead does not move in response to a shock to labor taxes or total 
taxes.
Figures 6 and 7 display the responses to shocks to labor income taxes and to the second 
definition of business taxes, respectively, now including their 68 and 95 percent standard 
error bands. The figures display also the responses to shocks to total taxes (the dashed line). 
As we have seen, the responses to labor income taxes differ minimally from the responses 
to total taxes, and the standard errors are only slightly larger.  With corporate income taxes, 
the responses are always significant at the 95 percent level; they are also significantly 
different from the responses to total taxes at the same level of confidence. 
6 Conclusions
We have investigated the effects of exogenous variations in taxes on a series of 
macroeconomic variables, with special emphasis on the unemployment rate and the labor 
market. Our analysis differs from the Romer and Romer (2010) seminal contribution in 
three main respects: first, in extending their data set of narrative records of exogenous tax 
innovations; second, in showing that methodological assumptions on both the specification 
and the estimation of the empirical model are crucial to quantify the size of the tax 
multipliers; third, in devoting special attention to the labor market implications of the 
changes in taxes. 21 
 
We have shown that an increase in tax receipts of one percent of GDP has a sizeable 
positive impact on the unemployment rate, and a negative impact on hours worked, labor 
market tightness and job finding probability. The negative effect on GDP is also sizeable, 
but somewhat in the mid range of other values found in the literature. We have shown that 
this depends on a series of methodological details, involving both the econometric 
specification and the estimation method. We have also shown that the unemployment 
multiplier of business taxes is larger than the one of personal income taxes, although the 
former is estimated a bit more imprecisely than the latter. 
Obtaining larger unemployment multipliers from business taxes than from personal 
income taxes poses a series of interesting theoretical challenges. In Monacelli, Perotti and 
Trigari (2010) we build an RBC model with search and matching frictions to analyze the 
effects of variations in government purchases. In that model we clarify that changes in 
government spending affect the hiring rate via variations in the value of non-work relative 
to work activity, which in turn affects the surplus from the job matching process. 
Importantly, the relative value of non-work activity captures not only the marginal value of 
leisure, but broadly the value of all non-market activities, including home production and 
unemployment benefits. 
One can employ the same model to analyze the labor market effects of exogenous changes 
in a variety of distortionary taxes. For example, variations in wage income taxes would also 
affect the hiring rate via their effect on the relative value of non-work activity. However, 
changes in employers’ payroll taxes, classified among the business taxes in our empirical 
analysis, would have exactly the same effect on surplus and hiring. Nash bargaining renders 
those two taxes effectively undistinguishable in the model. There are several other tax 
categories that can be modeled within the baseline theoretical framework. For example, we 
can introduce investment and employment tax credits as directly affecting the cost of hiring 
a worker (as either a subsidy per vacancy open or a subsidy per new hire). More generally, 
mapping our tax categories in the data into model counterparts requires some thinking, but 
the model lends itself easily to this exercise. Further, while there is already extensive work 
on the steady-state effects of various taxes and subsidies in the baseline Mortensen and 22 
 
Pissarides model, the study of their dynamic effects over the business cycle is quite limited. 
We plan to explore these issues in future research.   
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Figure 1. Unemployment Rate in the US. 25 
 
Figure 2. Favero-Giavazzi OLS specification.
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Figure 3. Mertens-Ravn IV Specification.
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Figure 4. Augmented Romer and Romer OLS Specification.
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Figure 5. Different Types of Taxes: Mertens and Ravn IV Specification. 
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Figure 6. Labor Taxes: Mertens and Ravn IV Specification.
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Figure 7.  Business Taxes: Mertens and Ravn IV Specification. 
un. rate

















































corp. + ind. 
Documentos de Trabajo 
Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers 
Central Bank of Chile 
  
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES PAST ISSUES 
 
La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:   
www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un 
costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por fax: 
(56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually for 
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231 
or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
DTBC – 622  
Valorización de Fondos mutuos monetarios y su impacto sobre la 
estabilidad financiera 
Luis Antonio Ahumada, Nicolás Álvarez y Diego Saravia  
Abril 2011 
   
DTBC – 621 
Sobre el nivel de Reservas Internacionales de Chile: Análisis a 
Partir de Enfoques Complementarios 
Gabriela Contreras, Alejandro Jara, Eduardo Olaberría y Diego Saravia  
Abril 2011 
   
DTBC – 620  
Un Test Conjunto de Superioridad Predictiva para los Pronósticos 
de Inflación Chilena 
Pablo Pincheira Brown  
Marzo 2011  
   
DTBC – 619  
The Optimal Inflation Tax in the Presence of Imperfect Deposit – 
Currency Substitution 
Eduardo Olaberría  
Marzo 2011 
   
DTBC – 618 
El Índice de Cartera Vencida como Medida de Riesgo de Crédito: 
Análisis y Aplicación al caso de Chile 
Andrés Sagner  
Marzo 2011 
   
DTBC – 617  
Estimación del Premio por Riesgo en Chile 
Francisca Lira y Claudia Sotz  
Marzo 2011    
DTBC – 616  
Uso de la aproximación TIR/Duración en la estructura de tasas: 
resultados cuantitativos bajo Nelson – Siegel  
Rodrigo Alfaro y Juan Sebastián Becerra 
Marzo 2011  
   
DTBC – 615  




   
DTBC – 614  
Does Lineariry of the Dynamics of Inflation Gap and 
Unemployment Rate Matter? 
Roque Montero 
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 613  
Modeling Copper Price: Regime Switching Approach 
Javier García – Cicco y Roque Montero  
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 612  
Riding the Roller Coaster: Fiscal Policies of Non-renewable 
Resources Exporters in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Mauricio Villafuerte  Pablo López-Murphy y Rolando Ossowski 
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 611 
Seigniorage and Distortionary Taxation in a Model with 
Heterogeneous Agents and Idiosyncratic Uncertainty  
Sofía Bauducco  
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 610  
Stress Tests for Banking Sector: A technical Note  
Rodrigo Alfaro y Andrés Sagner  
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 609 
Riding the Roller Coaster:  Fiscal Policies of Nonrenewable 
Resources Exporters in Latin American and the Caribbean  
Mauricio Villafuerte, Pablo López – Murphy and Rolando Ossowski  
Febrero 2011 
   
DTBC – 608 
Floats, Pegs and the Transmission of Fiscal Policy  
Giancarlo Corsetti, Keith Kuester and Gernot J. Müller  
Febrero 2011 